Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure? by Xavier Calsamiglia et al.
 
Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure? 
 
 
Xavier Calsamiglia 
Department of Economics and Business 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CREA 
xavier.calsamiglia@upf.edu 
 
Teresa Garcia-Milà 
Department of Economics and Business 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CREA 
teresa.garcia-mila@upf.edu 
 
Therese J. McGuire 
Management and Strategy Department 
Kellogg School of Management 
Northwestern University 
and 
Institute for Policy Research 
Northwestern University   
therese-mcguire@northwestern.edu 
 
 
 
Preliminary version: August 2004 
Revised version:  August 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We wish to thank Elena Jarocinska for research assistance and Andreu Mas-Colell and Jaume Ventura for very 
useful comments.  Garcia-Milà and Calsamiglia acknowledge support from Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y 
Ciencia (SEJ2004-06877 and BEC2003-00412).  
Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure? 
 
Abstract 
 
Differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization observed between the U.S. and many 
countries in Europe cannot be explained within the standard theory of fiscal 
decentralization. By introducing preferences for solidarity – equality in the provision of 
public goods and services across regions – we show that different decentralization 
schemes can coexist as efficient choices. We develop a model of fiscal decentralization 
that incorporates tastes for solidarity, multiple levels of government, and various tax and 
transfer instruments. We find that when solidarity is added to the traditional fiscal-
federalism framework, the choice along the decentralized-to-centralized spectrum shifts 
toward a more centralized system. 
 
 
 1  Introduction 
A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal 
decentralization.
1 Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in 
setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their 
counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and other European 
countries. In recent years, countries formerly subject to dictatorships or communism have been 
considering decentralization of fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the 
process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming 2006). Yet, much of Europe remains 
immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing 
authority. 
As Oates (1972, 1999) has argued, there can be significant efficiency gains to having a federal 
system with fiscally empowered sub-national levels of government. In particular, a decentralized 
system can accommodate varying demands for public goods across regions.  The arguments for a 
centralized system include economies of scale in the production of the public good, consumption 
spillovers across regions, and the difficulty of accomplishing income redistribution at the local 
level (see, for example, Brown and Oates, 1987).  When it is recognized that education and health 
are among the most important (in terms of budget share) publicly provided goods in the 
developed world,
2 it is difficult to explain within the traditional framework differences in the 
degree of fiscal decentralization between the U.S. and many European countries. Education and 
health are  private goods (services) for which demand is likely to vary across regions and 
localities due to differences in income and preferences; both economies of scale in production 
and spillover benefits are arguably small; and there is choice over how redistributive to  make the 
delivery of these services.  For these two goods/services, Oates’ decentralization theorem (Oates, 
1972, page 35) would seem to validate the choices made in the U.S. to decentralize provision.  
So, are the Europeans wrong? 
                                                      
1 For the year 2000, the percentage of total revenues raised by the central government  in the United States was 59 
percent, while the average in the European Union was 83 percent (excluding Malta and Cyprus for lack of data). See 
International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics  (2005). 
2 See Gruber (2005) for figures for the United States and OECD (2003) for figures that include other countries.  
  1Not necessarily. In this paper we approach the issue of the optimal degree of decentralization 
from a point of view closely related with the redistribution role of the government. There are 
many goods –health and education being perhaps the most compelling examples– that are private 
goods (in the sense that there is rivalry in consumption and agents can be excluded from 
consuming them) and arguably do not generate significant externalities and, yet, they are publicly 
provided because of what James Tobin has called “specific egalitarianism”, which he defines as 
“the view that certain specific scarce commodities should be distributed less unequally than the 
ability to pay for them” (Tobin, 1970, page 264).  These goods and services are viewed as 
important in determining the ability to compete in life. While it is feasible to (and many countries 
actually do)  provide different levels of these services to people and regions of different means, a 
compelling case can be made for equal provision of these two services with the goal of achieving 
equal opportunity.
3    
In Garcia-Milà and McGuire (2004), the authors explore the idea of a taste for equality in the 
public provision of certain goods and services across regions, what the authors call solidarity.  
These preferences might stem from a desire to bring or hold a country together after an upheaval 
or from a desire to provide access to essential public goods to all residents of the country. The 
authors demonstrate that inter-regional transfers aimed at reducing the variance across regions in 
public provision of these goods are desirable if preferences for solidarity are strong.  Rich regions 
will voluntarily transfer resources to poor regions to bring public spending up in the poor region 
(and, concomitantly, down in the rich region).  This transference of resources is done at the local 
level–there is no need for central government involvement, other than as a coordinating device, 
perhaps. 
The notion of solidarity includes two aspects. The first aspect is the determination of the set 
of goods and services that are the object of specific equalitarism. In countries with weak notions 
of solidarity this may be reduced to primary education and life-death surgery, while countries 
with strong notions of solidarity might include all levels of education, health and other essential 
                                                      
3 Indeed, the trend in primary and secondary education provision within states in the U.S. has been toward reducing 
inequities across local school districts in accordance with equality clauses in state constitutions.  Inequities in 
spending per pupil between states remain large, however. See Murray, Evans and Schwab (1998). 
  2goods. The second aspect of solidarity is a parameter measuring the intensity of preferences for 
equality in the provision of these essential goods. Thus, redistribution is the consequence of 
preferences founded not exclusively in pure self-interest but reflecting a concern for justice or 
equity. Support for preferences of this type, both in surveys and experimental work, is well 
established (see Konow, 2003, for a comprehensive discussion of the literature on justice). 
Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) examine the idea that preferences over inequality are 
important and may differ between the U.S. and Europe.  They find that individuals report to be 
less happy in the presence of inequality and that the European dislike of inequality is stronger 
than the American.  
In the present paper, we take the argument in Garcia-Milà and McGuire (2004) a meaningful 
step forward by recognizing that solidarity is like a pure public good–one rich region’s generosity 
in transferring resources to poor regions benefits other rich regions. With a pure public good, 
because of spillovers in consumption and the ability to free ride on the generosity of others, local 
provision (even if it includes interregional transfers) may be inefficient and a role for the central 
government may be justified.  In this paper, we show that when solidarity is added to the 
traditional fiscal-federalism framework, the choice along the decentralized-to-centralized 
spectrum shifts toward a more centralized system. Differences in tastes for solidarity may well 
then explain different degrees of decentralization.  
In contrast with the standard approach, the inequality concerns herein are not imposed by a 
central government on to selfish agents; what drives the quest for equality in the public provision 
of certain goods is not a social welfare function, but rather the preferences for equality of the 
agents. 
 The present paper is formally related to recent contributions to the fiscal federalism literature 
in which the local governments’ preferences display a concern about the provision of local public 
goods in other regions. Besley and Coate (2003) and Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2005) provide 
two distinct models of the choice of the degree of decentralization.  In contrast to our approach, 
Besley and Coate are interested in the inefficiencies created by the strategic behavior of locally 
elected representatives to a central legislature.  Alesina, Angeloni and Etro build a positive model 
  3that predicts what type of federal system will arise if regional governments have a say.  Our 
model is normative in that we seek to characterize the best institutional design for the provision 
and financing of local public goods when individuals care about solidarity. 
What drives redistribution among regions in our case differs from the idea of interregional 
transfers as a means of sharing regional idiosyncratic risk, as argued, for example, in the work of 
Persson and Tabellini (1996) and Lockwood (1999). Instead, we focus on redistribution among 
regions as a means to provide equality of opportunity in accordance with solidarity preferences.  
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we characterize and evaluate the 
normative qualities of three stylized systems of fiscal federalism in a world where people have 
preferences for equality of provision of a set of goods and services that are the object of specific 
equalitarism. We then simulate outcomes under the three systems, altering the preferences for 
solidarity from weak to strong. In the conclusion we argue that our model helps to explain why 
systems with different degrees of decentralization endure.  
2  A theory of fiscal decentralization with regional solidarity 
We specify a model with a central government and n regional governments. Let region i have 
initial wealth  i ω and 
1
n
j j ω
= Ω=∑ represent aggregate wealth. There are two commodities: a 
privately provided good,  ,  and a publicly provided good,  , which we refer to as the public 
good even though both goods are private goods in that consumption is rival and excludable. The 
“public good” is an aggregate of all private goods for which, following Tobin’s terminology, the 
domain of inequality is restricted (Tobin, 1970). The size of this set can vary from one country to 
another and it is an important determinant of the scope of solidarity. 
i c i g
We assume that all regions are concerned with inequalities in the provision of the public good 
across regions, as measured by the variance  
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The idea that public goods provided in one region can directly affect the utility of another 
region is a common component of many economic models of the local public sector (see 
Rubinfeld, 1987).  What differs about our approach is that the public goods we consider 
(education and health, for example) are in fact private goods with insignificant spillovers to 
distant districts. The externality comes from the fact that people care about equal provision of 
basic needs, such as education and health, so the level of provision in other regions affects own 
utility through the variance in the provision of those goods and services.  
While differences in the choice of public goods across regions can occur either because of 
differences in preferences for those goods or because of differences in wealth, we are particularly 
concerned about the differences that occur because some regions are rich and can afford high 
levels of public goods, and other regions are poor and do not have the resources to provide 
similar levels of public goods.  
If the allocation  is Pareto optimal, then for any  1 (, )
n
jj j cg = %% { } 1,2,..., i ∈ n
≠
j
 it is a solution to the 
problem: 
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The first order necessary conditions for this problem are therefore necessary conditions for 
Pareto-optimality. 
The Lagrangian expression for this problem is 
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and since constant terms can be ignored it can be written as 
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with   1 i α = . The Kuhn-Tucker first order necessary conditions are:  
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In the case of interior solutions, each of these inequalities must hold with equality and, for any 
pair of regions i,j, the following equalities must hold 
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Where the derivative 
i
e
g
∂
∂
, measuring the impact of the public good on the inequality index, has 
been computed as follows: 
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By the usual interpretation of Lagrangian multipliers,  j α  is the marginal increase in the 
objective function (the utility of region i) if the j-th constraint (the utility of region j) is relaxed. 
Hence  j α  is the relative weight of the j-th region and 
j
j
j
u
c
α
∂
∂
 can be interpreted as the marginal 
contribution of the j-th region’s consumption to social welfare.  
Equation (8) requires that the marginal contribution of the private good to social welfare be 
the same in all regions. Equation (9) requires the equality of the marginal contributions of the 
public good to social welfare in all regions. Finally, equation (10) establishes that the marginal 
contribution to social welfare of the private good equals that of the public good in all regions. 
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in a given region i has two components: the direct effect,
i
i
i
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, and the indirect effect of gi on 
all regions’ welfare through e 
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The indirect effect reflects the public-good nature of e: when region i alters its level of gi it 
impacts e and results in spillover benefits or costs for other regions.   If the provision of public 
goods across regions is equalized, then  i gg =  and the indirect effect disappears. 
We next present and characterize the choices made under three different systems of fiscal 
federalism: 
a.  Complete centralization: In this model, the central government imposes a uniform tax 
function to raise funds for provision of a uniform level of the public good across regions 
in the country. Intergovernmental grants from the central government to the regions are 
the sole source of funding for expenditures on the public good. Regional governments are 
essentially administrative arms of the central government.  They make no decisions. 
b.  Complete decentralization: In this model, regional governments have taxing authority and 
revenue-raising responsibility. They are free to set the level of the public good without 
any interference (or assistance) from the central government. They can decide to make 
voluntary contributions to other regional governments to help them increase spending on 
the public good. 
c.  Guaranteed minimum level: This model combines some but not all attributes of the other 
two models. The central government imposes a uniform tax system to raise funds for a 
central grant to regions that supports a minimal (adequate) level of the public good in each 
region. Regions have local taxing authority that they can employ to adjust the spending 
levels above the minimal required level.  Regions do not have authority to make voluntary 
contributions to other regions. 
We compare the outcome for each system to the Pareto optimality conditions (equations 8-10) 
derived above. 
  72.1  Centralized financing of regional governments 
Under this system, taxing power is solely in the hands of the central government.  The central 
government does not discriminate among regions and thus imposes a common tax function and 
gives a common grant to each region.  Spending on the public good is the same across regions as 
the only source of funding is the uniform central grant.  Regions have no decision-making power 
in this system: once the central tax function and central grant are set, private and public goods are 
determined. 
To simplify the analysis we assume a proportional tax on income,  () i t i φ ω = ω , where t is the 
tax rate and is the same for all regional governments. Private consumption  is equal to after-tax 
income 
i c
(1 ) i t ω − .  We define g as the common level of public good realized in each region.  Note 
that the variance in public good spending e is equal to zero in this case. 
The decision variables of the government are the tax rate, t, and the common level of public 
good, g, for all regions. By the balanced budget restrictions, for every level of t, unique levels of 
public good g and private goods ci are generated. Hence the set of allocations attainable through 
the centralized system can be parametrized by t. Not all allocations are necessarily second best 
Pareto-optimal: it is possible that by changing t the utility levels of all regions could increase.
4  
Assume that the central government’s objective function is such that it does not choose Pareto-
dominated allocations. This means that, given the utility levels  ( ) (1 ) , , jj ut g ω − % %% e  of regions 
, the following problem is solved:  ji ≠
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4 See the simulations in section 3. 
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As the central government chooses to provide the same level of public good to all regions 
(gi=g for all i), e=0 and all terms that involve  the solidarity variable drop out. 
The Kuhn Tucker conditions for a maximum are:  
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These inequalities hold with equality in an interior solution and we obtain 
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This condition states that a weighted average of the regions’ marginal contributions of the 
private good, where the weights are each region’s relative share of total wealth, is equal to the 
average marginal contribution of the public good to social welfare.  In general, this will differ 
from the Pareto optimality condition in equation (10) and the centralized system will lead to 
inefficient outcomes. The inefficiency arises from utility losses associated with the uniformity 
imposed by a centralized system: the central tax function does not discriminate by region of 
residence and a uniform level of g is chosen by the central government. 
2.2  Decentralized decisions by regional governments 
Under this system, each regional government has complete freedom of choice over both the 
private and the public good. In addition, each can set interregional transfers from region i to j,  sij, 
which are voluntary contributions to solidarity. Thus, each regional government chooses gi, ci and 
  9sij (for j≠i)
5, taking all other variables as given, so as to solve the following maximization 
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The Nash equilibrium is obtained by solving simultaneously the n systems of necessary 
conditions. Setting up the Lagrangian of the i-th region: 
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Assuming interior solutions for ci and gi, and noting that 
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The marginal contributions of ci and gi to i’s utility are equalized, but, because each region 
acts independently to maximize its own utility, the indirect effect does not take into account the 
impact of gi through e on other regions’ utilities as required in equation (10) for a Pareto 
optimum. Hence, the Nash equilibrium is inefficient because regions do not take into account the 
spillover effect of their contributions to other regions’ welfare when setting their interregional 
transfers.  At the same time, regions have an incentive to free-ride on the generosity of other 
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  10regions thereby resulting in an inefficient level of transfers to other regions. 
Inter-regional transfers will be positive only under reasonable and intuitive conditions.  If 
, then from (23) and (25) we get  0 ij s >
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only be positive if  0 j gg −<, in other words, if j is a region with below average public 
expenditure. 
Moreover, if  , both (24) and (25) hold with equality and therefore:  0 ij s >
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we obtain  
   (31)  i gg >
That is, region i sends transfers to region j if   and  ij gg > j gg < . Obviously, a corner 
solution for sij may arise, and in that case these conditions are not met. 
2.3 Decentralized decisions with a centrally guaranteed minimum level  
We finally consider a mixed model in which the central government finances a uniform, 
minimum expenditure on the public good and the regions are then free to tax themselves if they 
want to spend more than the centrally funded minimum.  We model a sequential game in which 
the central government is a Stackelberg leader. In the first stage, the central government sets a 
common tax rate t for all regions. The revenue is equally distributed so that the grant b is equal to 
  111
1 n
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t
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= =Ω ∑ . This grant sets up a minimum public good level in all regions.  
At a later stage, knowing the tax rate and the corresponding grant, the regions are free to 
choose a higher level of the public good by raising additional revenue from local taxes. The 
second phase is modeled as a simultaneous game with the regions as players. The strategic 
variables are the levels of the private good, ci , and the locally financed public goods,  . 
The level of the i-th region’s public good is 
0 i gr ≥
ii gg r b = + . 
Given the value of the central government’s strategic variable, the tax rate t, and taking the 
values of the other region’s strategic variables as given, the i-th regional government chooses ci 
and   so as to solve  i gr
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The Lagrangian expression for this problem is: 
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If the minimum public good level guaranteed by the central government is below the level 
that the regional government would like to provide of that public good, we will have an interior 
solution for  . Assuming also an interior solution for ci , from (35) and (36) we obtain  i gr
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At the margin, the decision of allocating resources between the private and the public good is 
identical to the decision in the decentralized case, and, as in that case, while the marginal 
contributions of the private and the public good to the region’s utility are equalized, the indirect 
  12effect does not take into account the impact of gi through e on other regions’ utilities as required 
for a Pareto optimum (equation (10)).  In other words, regions do not take into account the effect 
of their decisions upon other regions’ welfare when setting their strategic variables.   
Still, assuming an interior solution for ci, if the minimum public good level guaranteed by the 
central government is equal or above the level that the regional government would like to provide 
of the public good, there will be no local provision of the public good, and thus we will have a 
corner solution  with . In this case from (35) and (36) we obtain  0 i gr =
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Although (38) differs from (10) for the same reasons as (37) does - regions do not take into 
account the effect of their decision upon other regions’ welfare - the central government 
guaranteed minimum level may result in an allocation that gets closer to, or could even reach, the 
optimal allocation as characterized in (10). 
Summing up, this case differs from the decentralized case in that the central government 
provides a given level of the public good, thereby potentially mitigating the free-rider problem, 
but, at the same time, potentially taking regions further away from their desired levels of the 
public good.  Whether one system results in a more efficient outcome than the other will depend 
on the level of the grant (minimum level of public good) set by the central government.  
3  Simulation results 
The insights from the theoretical results are clear. When solidarity is present and demands for 
the public good vary by region, then both centralized and decentralized systems are inefficient. 
The centralized solution is inefficient because it involves utility losses associated with a common 
tax function and a uniform level of public good across all regions. The decentralized solution is 
inefficient because of the free-rider problems associated with local provision of the public good 
solidarity. The solution involving a guaranteed minimum is a combination of both, and therefore 
reflects both types of inefficiencies (as well as the corrective aspects of both).  Which system 
dominates will depend on the relative importance of the inefficiencies that arise under each 
  13system.  These inefficiencies in turn depend on the strength of the solidarity preferences and on 
the differences in preferences and incomes across regions. 
In this section we simulate the three systems presented above.  Our goal is to characterize the 
relationship between the strength of solidarity preferences and the choice of the degree of 
decentralization. We will see that, as preferences for solidarity strengthen, more centralized 
systems perform better.  
We consider a simple multilevel government consisting of two regions,
6 each with 
preferences represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions: 
 
1
11 1 1
1
(, ,)
1
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e
αα
γ
− =
+
 
  
1
22 2 2
1
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1
uc g e K c g
e
αα
γ
− =
+
 
where  and e is the variance of { }.   0, 0 ii cg ≥≥ 1, 2 gg
The parameter γ is a nonnegative number capturing the strength of the solidarity preferences. 
When γ=0 preferences for solidarity are nonexistent. To clarify the nature of the class of utility 
functions, decompose the utility function into two parts: the standard utility,
1
ii Kc g
δ δ − , 
representing preferences between the privately provided good and the publicly provided good, 
and the solidarity effect, 
1
1 e γ +
. When there is no inequality, the variance e equals zero and the 
solidarity effect takes its maximum value, 1. Also, total utility coincides with the standard utility. 
When there is inequality (the variance e is positive), the solidarity effect is less than one and total 
utility is less than the standard utility. The solidarity effect (and therefore utility) tends to zero as 
the variance grows to infinity. 
For the simulations that follow we fix 
1
10,
4
K α = =  . There is a rich region with wealth 
1 80 ω = , and a poor region with wealth  2 20 ω = . 
  Our simulation results are qualitatively the same for various values of the parameter α, 
including when preferences are identical (α=1/2). We have also performed simulations with 
  14identical Stone-Geary utility functions, with no major changes in the simulation results and 
conclusions. What is central for our problem are the inequalities generated by differences in 
wealth between regions, not any differences in taste. 
We evaluate each system by comparing graphically the outcomes under each system to the set 
of Pareto optimal utility allocations represented by the utility frontier.  For each simulation we 
derive the utility frontier and the following. 
a.  Locus of centralized allocations. For each possible central tax rate and its corresponding 
level of public good, there is a resulting pair of utility levels.  We vary the central tax rate 
from zero to one and plot each of the resulting pairs of utility levels to form the locus of 
all possible centralized allocations.  
b.  Decentralized equilibrium D. The decentralized system results in a unique point that 
reflects a Nash equilibrium among the regions. The regions choose the levels of their own 
private and public goods along with the levels of transfers to other regions. 
c.  Locus of allocations guaranteeing a minimum. For each possible central tax rate, which 
finances a minimal level of public good in each region, the regions choose their own 
levels of private and public goods resulting in a Nash equilibrium.  Thus, for each central 
tax rate, a Nash equilibrium pair of utilities is plotted.  As above, we vary the central tax 
rate from zero to one to trace out the locus of all possible allocations under the guaranteed 
minimum system. 
3.1  No taste for solidarity 
In the case where regions do not have a preference for solidarity,  γ=0,  the utility functions 
take the form: 
 
3 1
44
11 1 1 (, ,)1 0 uc g e c g =  
  
3 1
44
22 22 (, , )1 0 uc g e c g =  
In Figure 1 we represent the utility levels attained under the three different systems. The 
decentralized solution D lies on the utility possibility frontier with optimal voluntary 
                                                                                                                                                                            
6 The extent of free riding will naturally be limited in this simple model because of the small number of regions. 
  15contributions at zero. This result is a finding of the standard theory of fiscal decentralization: if 
all 
 possible choices for the central government. These 
allo
goods are private and demands vary across regions, the decentralized solution is optimal. 
The locus of possible allocations under a centralized system is represented by the solid, 
elliptical line. We find it useful to take as references two particular points on the locus: P, where, 
in the Rawlsian tradition, the utility of the poor region is maximized; and R, the allocation that 
maximizes the utility of the rich region. The set of allocations between P and R are not “second 
best” Pareto dominated and therefore are
cations fall short of the utility frontier. 
Finally, under a guaranteed minimum system, the locus of possible allocations is represented 
by the dashed line, which starts with the point D reflecting a central tax rate of zero.  Virtually the 
entire locus is closer to the utility frontier than any of the feasible centralized outcomes. Indeed, 
if the centrally provided public good is not too high and both regions choose positive amounts of 
additional public good, the locus is on the frontier. This can easily be seen by checking that, in 
this case, where solidarity preferences do not exist (and thus  0
e
u ∂
=
∂
), the necessary conditions 
for an inte -(10)). 
Figure 1:  Utility allocations with no taste for solidarity 
rior solution (37) are also sufficient for Pareto optimality (see equations (8)
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The centralized solutions are outperformed, in the sense that they are further away from the 
utility frontier, by a large range of the guaranteed minimum solutions, as well as by the 
decentralized solution, which is on the utility frontier.  
3.2
r it is closer to the utility frontier than the relevant portion of 
the locu
Figure 2:  Utility allocations w h weak solidarity preferences 
 because it addresses the 
free-rider problem at the same time that it allows for regional variation. 
3.3
We now consider the case of strong solidarity preferences (γ=0.005), with the allocations 
  Weak taste for solidarity 
Consider now the case where preferences for solidarity are weak (γ=0.0003). Figure 2 
illustrates the possible allocations under all three systems.  The decentralized outcome is no 
longer on the utility frontier, howeve
s of centralized allocations.  
it
 
For a significant range of central government tax rates, the guaranteed minimum system 
outperforms, in the sense of being nearer the utility frontier, both the centralized and the 
decentralized systems. The guaranteed minimum system performs well
  Strong taste for solidarity 
  17under all three systems represented in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Utility allocations with strong solidarity preferences 
 
In this case, the relevant range of centralized allocations is very close to the utility frontier 
and clearly dominates the decentralized solution D, which is far from the utility frontier.  The 
centralized system performs well relative to the decentralized system because the free-rider 
problem associated with local provision of the public good solidarity looms large when regions 
care deeply about solidarity.  The guaranteed minimum system also performs well.  In fact, for a 
range of central tax rates, its allocations are closer to the utility frontier than any allocations under 
the other two systems.  
In summary, we find that in the presence of weak solidarity preferences, the decentralized 
allocation is closer to the utility frontier than any of the centralized solutions.  When solidarity 
preferences are strong, many centralized solutions outperform the decentralized solution. In 
addition, in the presence of solidarity preferences, weak or strong, some allocations under the 
guaranteed minimum system are quite close to the utility frontier and trump allocations under 
  18either the centralized or decentralized system. 
4  Conclusion  
Health and education are two of the largest components of subnational public sectors in 
developed countries today.  These publicly-provided goods are essentially private goods by 
nature, exhibiting arguably small spillover benefits; the production of these services is labor 
intensive and not subject to strong economies of scale; and, because  incomes and tastes vary, the 
demand for these services is likely to vary across regions. Thus, a decentralized system would 
seem to be called for in order to achieve a more efficient match between demand and supply of 
these publicly-provided goods. 
The contribution of this paper is to shift the emphasis of the decentralization debate from the 
allocative  role of the government in solving market failures generated by the existence of public 
goods and externalities to the distributional role. Our treatment of the concern for equality differs 
from the standard approach in two respects. First, there is no social welfare function 
incorporating egalitarian principles: the objective of the central government is to reach a Pareto-
efficient allocation when the sub-national governments care about inequalities. Second, as Tobin 
indicates, to the extent that economists are egalitarians at all, they are general egalitarians: if an  
unequal distribution of food and shelter is deemed undesirable economists tend to look to 
changing the distributions of wealth and income.  Efforts at equalizing the consumption of 
specific commodities will inevitably generate inefficiencies. In this paper, we depart from the 
standard view and advocate Tobin’s idea of specific egalitarianism: we find socially appealing 
the idea that the distribution of certain goods and sevices should be less unequal than that of 
income and wealth.
 7    Our main contribution is to show that when people care about the 
distribution of these publicly provided goods, indeed, if they get disutility from there being an 
unequal distribution across regions, a more centralized system can Pareto dominate a 
decentralized system.  This is the case because equality in the provision of publicly provided 
                                                      
7 A radical example presented by Tobin (1970) is the political power contained in a vote: in this case, strict equality 
is such an important social objective that a voluntary transfer of this political power from one individual to another in 
exchange for money is forbiden in spite of the fact that this would be a Pareto-improving trade. Stiglitz (2000) 
discusses the idea of specific egalitarianism as a justification for public provision of health care.  
  19goods (i.e., solidarity) is a pure public good and a centralized system will internalize the 
associated externalities and address the free rider problem. Where preferences for solidarity are 
strong, as apparently they are in many European countries and with respect to education in many 
U.S. states, centralizing the provision of publicly provided goods and services can increase social 
welfare.  We thus provide a possible explanation for the endurance of very different systems of 
fiscal federalism in countries with seemingly similar economic, political and historical traditions. 
We analyze an intermediate system that involves elements of the centralized system (a 
centrally financed minimum level of public good) and the decentralized system (regional taxing 
authority).  This system often outperforms the polar systems because it combines the externality 
internalizing aspects of one with the regional authority to adjust spending levels of the other.  
Countries with either weak or strong preferences for solidarity may be well served by such a 
system.  
The conclusion that a system that combines the involvement of the different levels of 
government outperforms the polar cases is similar to the superiority of flexible over rigid unions 
obtained in Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2005) in their study of supranational jurisdictions.   Our 
model differs from theirs in that we consider a very different type of externality – they consider 
spillovers of public good spending; we introduce a concern for equality in the provision of certain 
goods, solidarity – and we allow for voluntary contributions among regions (a decentralized 
response) and show that such contributions do not solve the problem. An interesting implication 
of our results is that, although preferences display a concern for equality, it is often the case that 
the optimal system is one in which the central government assures universal minimum levels in 
all regions rather than imposing complete equalization. 
Several important questions are left unanswered.  Perhaps the most important question 
concerns the origin of strong and weak preferences for solidarity.  The U.S. and Europe share 
many commonalities in terms of tradition, culture, political philosophy, demographics, and 
values. Yet fundamental choices related to solidarity, such as how much to rely on market 
mechanisms to deliver various goods and services and how much emphasis to place on individual 
freedom and responsibility, are often quite different.  A second set of questions involves the 
  20evolution of preferences for solidarity and the implications for changes in the degree of fiscal 
decentralization.  In Spain, immediately after the fall of Franco a centralized system was needed 
to keep the country together and to bring the different regions closer in alignment in terms of 
public finances and public services.  Today, after more than 25 years of experience with a stable 
democracy, regional redistribution, and various levels of regional competencies in delivering 
public goods, the argument for a centralized system to deliver solidarity seems less compelling.  
In Germany, centralized redistribution of resources was harder to achieve and garnered less 
popular support once the regions of the much poorer East joined the richer regions of the West.   
The efficiency losses associated with centralized redistribution became more difficult to tolerate. 
Our model offers a new lens through which to view and to gain a better understanding of the 
demands for changes in intergovernmental fiscal systems. 
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